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Symposium on War Duration
Challenges to the Study of Long Wars
Zachary C. Shirkey, Hunter College, City University of New York
Rationalist, psychological, and domestic politics approaches have all generated internally
consistent, plausible explanations for long wars. But sorting out which of these explana-
tions is most valid is quite difficult, because definitional questions bedevil the study of
war duration, and more importantly, because it is very hard to evaluate the evidence
for competing explanations of war duration. The latter difficulty arises for three reasons.
First, many state behaviors are consistent with multiple, competing explanations of long
wars. Second, in most states, multiple people play important roles in crafting foreign pol-
icies, meaning different leaders may have different primary motives for continuing a war.
Last, even individual leaders may be driven by multiple motives. These challenges are rel-
evant for both case study research and large-N studies. Recognizing these challenges should
help to improve future studies of the causes of long wars.
Keywords: war duration, research design, multi-causality, domestic politics, psychology,
rationality
Why do states continue to wage wars after it is apparent that a victory cannotbe obtained quickly and that the fighting will go on for years rather than
months? This is an important and difficult question. It is important because long
wars are particularly destructive. They produce more fatalities1 and are a greater
threat to regimes’ stability than are shorter wars.2 The difficulty of studying long
Thank you to Thomas Dolan, Roger Karapin, Dan Reiter, Elizabeth Stanley, Alex Weisiger, and
Polity’s three anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions.
1. H. E. Goemans,War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World
War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000), 65; Bethany Lacina, “Explaining the Se-
verity of Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (2006): 276–89; Zachary C. Shirkey, “When
andHowMany: The Effects of Third Party Joining onCasualties andDuration in InterstateWars,”
Journal of Peace Research 49 (2012): 321–34, at 331; Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to
Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982); Alex Weisiger,
Logics of War: Explanations for Limited and Unlimited Conflicts (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 2013), 7–8, 59–60.
2. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Gary Woller, “War and the Fate of
Regimes: A Comparative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 86 (1992): 638–46, at 643.
Published online March 5, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/696290
Polity, volume 50, number 2 (April 2018), pp. 225–237. 0032-3497/2018/5002-0007$10.00.
© 2018 Northeastern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.
This content downloaded from 146.096.128.036 on August 24, 2018 06:36:34 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
wars is not that it is challenging to think about reasons why states would continue
to fight. Indeed, rationalist, psychological, and domestic politics approaches have
all generated logical and plausible explanations for the duration of long wars. Rather,
the problem stems in part from the fact that definitional questions and uncertainty
about how broadly findings can be applied bedevil the study of war duration. Fur-
thermore, even though many explanations for long wars can be generated, it is very
hard to determine which competing explanation is most compelling—both for wars
in general and for specific wars. Each of these problems will be explored in turn.
What are Long Wars and How Widely Can Theories
of War Duration be Applied?
As with many questions in social science, definitional and applicability problems
plague the study of long wars. In the first place, there is no agreed-upon definition
of what a long war is. While certainly a war that lasts many years, such as the Iran-
Iraq War (1980–1988), is a long war and a war that lasts less than a month, such as
the Six Days War (1967), is not a long war, the definitional cutoff between these two
concepts is unclear. In particular, are wars that last longer than one year, but less
than two years, long wars? The answer is not obvious.
This makes it tempting to define long wars using some variable other than time.
For instance, perhaps long wars are best thought of as wars in which a chance at
peace was missed. Even presuming that it would be possible to determine what
should be considered to be a genuinemissed opportunity, some explanations of long
wars, such as those based on commitment problems, argue that often no such earlier
chance at peace would have been available.3 In other words, wars can endure even
without leaders missing opportunities for settlement. Thus, we are stuck with using
duration to define long wars and must accept a somewhat arbitrary cutoff between
long and shortwars. For the purposes of this article, wars lasting longer than 18months
will be considered long wars.
More problematic than length alone are questions of what counts as a single war.
For instance, is a set of linked conflicts, such as the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815),
one war or a series of wars? Provided that the halts in the fighting are more than
failed cease-fires, it is presumably best to see such conflicts as many wars, especially
when the individual conflicts are terminated by formal peace treaties.4 Indeed, there
3. James D. Fearon, “Fighting Rather than Bargaining,” Unpublished manuscript, 2013, 2–4
(Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University); Weisiger, Logics of War, 16–32 (see note 1 above).
4. Unfortunately, the decline in formal declarations of war and concomitant decline in for-
mal peace treaties makes such a task more difficult. See Christopher Greenwood, “The Concept
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are whole research agendas, such as, but not limited to, the literature on enduring
rivalries, that study such linked conflicts.5 Thornier still are instances, such as in
the First Balkan War (1912–13), where some belligerent states leave the still-raging
conflict and then return at a later date. If we approach wars in a dyadic manner,
should such temporary exits be seen as war termination? Usually they are not, but
a case could be made that they should be seen that way.6
In addition, findings on war duration may not be applicable over the whole uni-
verse of interstate wars. This is because the nature of war may vary across time pe-
riods and also according to states’ level of development7 and regime type.8 These
factors should affect the size and ability of the forces employed, the resolve and re-
siliency of the states engaged, and the issues at stake. For instance, European wars in
the seventeenth and twentieth centuries were more likely to become total wars com-
pared to European wars in the mid-eighteenth and late nineteenth centuries, which
were farmore limited in nature. Similarly, the size of military forces deployed in Eu-
ropean wars have expanded and contracted over the centuries, in response to shifts
in the relationship between the state and the governed and in response to changes
in military technology. Explanations of war duration need to be able to address the
causal role of these variations in intensity, aims, and scale, or else to state the scope
of the applicability of their findings. Reiter’s call in this symposium to think about
the connections between war initiation and duration should help with this problem,
especially in relation to the aims of the belligerent states.9
In truth, it is possible to make too much of such semantic problems and ques-
tions of scope. Many areas in political science face similar issues. Terrorism, for in-
stance, is notoriously difficult to define,10 and all social science theories are limited in
the scope of their applicability. Yet, as long as researchers are aware of these potential
of War in Modern International Law,” International & Comparative Law Quarterly 36 (1987):
283–306.
5. Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and Peace in International Rivalry (Ann Arbor: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 2001); Scott Wolford, “The Problem of Shared Victory: War-Winning
Coalitions and Postwar Peace,” Journal of Politics 79 (2017): 702–16.
6. For instance, see Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Du-
rability of Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).
7. Douglas Lemke, “War and Development,” International Studies Review 5 (2003): 55–63,
at 57–58.
8. Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller, “War and the Fate of Regimes,” 648 (see note 2
above).
9. Dan Reiter, “Unifying the Study of the Causes and Duration of Wars,” Polity 50 (2018):
168–77.
10. Alex Schmid, “Terrorism: The Definitional Problem,” Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law 36 (2004): 375–419.
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problems, address them, and make clear what sort of choices they have made, pro-
ductive research should be possible.
Competing Explanations for Long Wars
A second problem for the study of war duration is that it is difficult to determine
which explanations of long wars are most compelling, for three reasons. First, many
state behaviors are consistent with the expectations and mechanisms of multiple,
competing explanations of long wars. In other words, evidence that is consistent
with a given theory can fail to confirm that explanation because the evidence is often
also consistent with rival explanations.
Second, as domestic politics explanations of war dynamics in general correctly ar-
gue, multiple people play important roles in crafting states’ foreign policies. Though
these leaders may all support continuing a war, they may do so for different reasons,
implying that multiple explanations could be in play. It also means that it is neces-
sary to determine which members of the leadership group are actually important in
deciding to continue the war and which of their arguments persuaded other waver-
ing, but critical, members of that group.
Third, individuals may have multiple motives for supporting continued fight-
ing. They may see little reason to clarify which reasons are most important and
instead argue that all of their reasons, when combined, make a compelling case for
continued fighting. Further, determining whether their reasons are genuine or are in-
stead rationalizations that are mobilized to buttress the individual’s actual reasons
may be difficult to untangle—not just for the scholar but perhaps even for the indi-
vidual.11 This, in turn, can make it difficult for scholars to sort out the relative merits
of various explanations of why a war lasted as long as it did beyond saying it was mul-
ticausal. Before discussing each of these difficulties in detail, the current state of the
war duration literature will be briefly summarized.
Most explanations of long wars fall into one of the following camps: rationalist,
domestic politics, and psychological. Rationalist explanations that also adopt the
simplifying assumption that states are unitary actors tend to find that private infor-
mation—which is one of the main rationalist causes of war—should be revealed
reasonably quickly by battles and offers for settlement. Thus, wars fought over pri-
vate information should be short.12 This has led rationalists to focus on the inability
11. Robert Jervis, “Understanding Beliefs,” Political Psychology 27 (2006): 641–63, at 644–45.
12. Robert Powell, “War as a Commitment Problem,” International Organization 60 (2006):
169–203, at 170–73.
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of one or more of the belligerent parties to credibly commit to honoring a peace
agreement as the best explanation of long wars,13 although other rationalist causes
of long wars—such as the introduction of new private information14—or wars
characterized mostly by expected, attritional battles which reveal no private infor-
mation15 are possible.
Wars fought due to commitment problems tend to be long because states pur-
sue extreme war aims in order to eliminate the commitment problems. Such aims
could include state death, regime change, the destruction of much of the good that
is at stake, or a major degradation of the opposing state’s power.16 Such expansive
war aims arise because of the nature of commitment problems. Commitment prob-
lems occur when what is being fought over would significantly shift the balance of
power between the various belligerent states or because one of the belligerent states
expects its opponent to become substantially stronger relative to it in the future.
Both of these problems mean that the state gaining power would be in a position
in the future to demand a more favorable settlement than it could obtain now. This
prevents the state from being able to commit in the long term to an agreement that
reflects the current distribution of power. Attempts to prevent such expected power
shifts require pursuing the sort of expansive war aims discussed above, which in
turn lead to long wars.
Domestic politics explanations of long wars usually focus on incentives and
constraints faced by individuals and leadership groups. Both individuals and lead-
ership groups may opt to continue wars because they benefit directly from the con-
flict, even though the war is not benefiting the state or society as a whole.17 For
13. Dan Reiter, How Wars End (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 22–50;
Robert Powell, “Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power,” American Journal of Political Science
56 (2012): 620–37, at 620–21; Weisiger, Logics of War, 16–32 (see note 1 above).
14. Zachary C. Shirkey, “Uncertainty and War Duration,” International Studies Review 18
(2016): 244–67, at 250–52.
15. Fearon, “Fighting Rather than Bargaining,” 9–10 (see note 3 above); Catherine Langlois
and Jean-Pierre Langlois, “Should Rational States Really Bargain While They Fight?,” unpub-
lished manuscript, Georgetown University and San Francisco University, 2012.
16. Bahar Leventoglu and Branislav L. Slantchev, “The Armed Peace: A Punctuated Equi-
librium Theory of War,” American Journal of Political Science 51 (2007): 755–71, at 766–67;
Powell, “Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power,” 630–32 (see note 13 above); Reiter, How Wars
End, 21–35 (see note 13 above); Elizabeth A. Stanley, Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts,
War Termination and the Korean War (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009); Wei-
siger, Logics of War, 16–32 (see note 1 above).
17. Sarah Croco, “The Decider’s Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domes-
tic Punishment,” American Political Science Review 105 (2011): 457–77, at 460–62; Goemans,
War and Punishment, 36–51 (see note 1 above); Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C.
Zachary C. Shirkey | 229
This content downloaded from 146.096.128.036 on August 24, 2018 06:36:34 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
instance, leaders’ ability to remain in office and even their physical safety may be
tied directly to the successful prosecution of the war. Similarly, leaders may profit
financially from the war. The key to such explanations is that the leadership group
has to be able to remain in power and continue the war, even though accepting a
peace offer would be optimal for the society at large. This in turn requires either
hiding setbacks from the broader population—something that should become in-
creasingly difficult over the course of a war—or suppressing popular discontent
with the war. Obviously, governments’ abilities to do this will vary by regime type,
the strength of governments’ repressive capacities, the scale of the setbacks faced
in the war, and how much cooperation is needed from society as a whole to wage
the war. To the extent that governments are able to do this, wars could continue
until the private benefits come to an end, there is a change in leadership, or the state’s
military collapses.
Alternatively, the leadership group could want to end the war, but might de-
pend on support from more hawkish constituencies in order to remain in power.
If the leadership group values its political survival more highly than its desire to
end the war, the war could continue until a turnover in leadership or military col-
lapse occurred.18
Psychological approaches argue that although leaders’ decisions are generally
reasoned and purposeful, they can be influenced or impaired by elements of the
human psyche; see, for instance, Stanley’s and Dolan’s contributions to this sym-
posium.19 Specifically, psychological approaches argue that factors such as cogni-
tive biases, the impact of emotion on beliefs and decision making, a focus on sunk
costs, or concerns about national honormay prevent settlement, thereby extending
conflicts.20 These factorsmay alter how leaders update their beliefs, causing them to
resist accepting rational offers for settlement. While these impediments ultimately
Prins, “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (2004): 937–
61, at 939–42; Stanley, Paths to Peace (see previous note).
18. Stanley, Paths to Peace (see note 16 above); Michael P. Colaresi, Scare Tactics: The Pol-
itics of International Rivalry (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2005).
19. Elizabeth A. Stanley, “War Duration and the Micro-Dynamics of Decision Making un-
der Stress,” Polity 50 (2018): 178–200. Thomas M. Dolan, “Moving Beyond Pathology: Why
Psychologists Should Care About Short Wars,” Polity 50 (2018): 201–14.
20. Thomas M. Dolan, “Go Big or Go Home? Positive Emotions and Responses to Wartime
Success,” International Studies Quarterly 60 (2016): 230–42; Thomas M. Dolan, “Demanding
the Impossible: Honor, Bargaining, and War,” Security Studies 24 (2015): 528–62; Dominic John-
son, Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions (Cambridge, Mass.: Har-
vard University Press, 2004). Alexander Lanoszka andMichael A. Hunzeker, “Rage of Honor: En-
tente Indignation and the Lost Chance for Peace in the First World War,” Security Studies 24
(2015): 662–95; Stanley, Paths to Peace (see note 16 above).
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can be overcome, they imply that wars may continue far longer than rational cal-
culation would suggest.
Despite their different assumptions, these varying explanations of long wars of-
ten predict similar behaviors (seeWeisiger in this symposium21). In particular, most
explanations of long wars predict a lack of updating by leaders and a tendency to
ignore or discount negative information. For rational, unitary actors, this may be
because leaders expect a long, difficult fight with setbacks, but believe such a war
is necessary because there are commitment problems that the war offers a fair pros-
pect of overcoming.22 Such rational, unitary actors may also believe they will tri-
umph in an attritional conflict due to a superior ability to bear costs; therefore, long
attritional conflicts would not be initially discouraging to them.23 Likewise, advo-
cates of psychological explanations might expect leaders to dismiss negative events
out of a reluctance to admit their errors, a refusal tomake tradeoffs, or observational
biases.24 Leaders focused on honor rather than tangible gains might also ignore set-
backs when decidingwhether or not to continue fighting.25 Finally, domestic politics
explanations would suggest that leaders may ignore setbacks if acknowledging or
acting on them would lead to leadership change or if leaders are likely to gain per-
sonally from continued fighting.26 All these explanations of longwars, both rational-
choice and psychological, would predict protracted fighting with few, if any, ex-
changes of offers between sides. These explanations would also predict that even
within councils of state there would be little change in expectations or willingness
to lower demands in response to negative information from the battlefield. Thus,
scholars with competing explanations of long wars might well point to the same ev-
idence as being consistent with their preferred theories.
Even competing explanations arising from within domestic politics approaches
can produce similar predictions about what sort of events should be associated with
21. Alex Weisiger, “Rationality and the Limits of Psychology in Explaining Interstate War
Duration,” Polity 50 (2018): 215–24.
22. Reiter, How Wars End, 25–34 (see note 13 above); Powell, “Persistent Fighting and
Shifting Power” (see note 13 above); Weisiger, Logics of War, 16–32 (see note 1 above).
23. Langlois and Langlois, “Should Rational States Really Bargain While They Fight?” (see
note 15 above); Shirkey, “Uncertainty and War Duration,” 252–54 (see note 14 above).
24. Dolan, “Go Big or Go Home?” (see note 20 above); Dolan, “Demanding the Impossible”
(see note 20 above); Stanley, Paths to Peace (see note 16 above).
25. Dolan, “Demanding the Impossible” (see note 20 above); Lanoszka and Hunzeker,
“Rage of Honor” (see note 20 above).
26. Croco, “The Decider’s Dilemma” (see note 17 above); Goemans, War and Punishment,
36–51 (see note 1 above); Mitchell and Prins, “Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force” (see
note 17 above); Stanley, Paths to Peace (see note 16 above).
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war termination. For instance, Stanley and Sawyer argue that wars can become pro-
tracted because of three distinct reasons arising from domestic politics.27 First,
leaders may have large personal stakes (political, financial, or related to their own
security) in a war, which leads them to favor continued fighting. Second, leaders
may not know that they should end a war, due to information obstacles that can
arise from organizational or psychological sources. Third, leadership groups may
be unable to end a war even though they would prefer to do so because certain con-
stituencies, whom they depend upon to remain in power, favor continued fighting.
For wars in which any of these three incentives for leaders to prolong the conflict
exists, Stanley and Sawyer logically suggest that a change in the ruling coalition is
needed to bring about peace and that war termination, therefore, is often associated
with such changes in ruling coalitions. Since a leadership change would be consis-
tent with any of the three explanations of how leaders’ personal incentives can pro-
long wars, a hypothetical large-N study that found a correlation between leadership
turnover and peace settlements would be unable to adjudicate between these pro-
posed domestic sources of long wars, although it would support domestic explana-
tions of war duration in general.28
These difficulties associated with sorting through evidence are not limited to
large-N studies. Although case studies can contextualize data, making it possible
to sift through the various causes, they have their own challenges. One obvious is-
sue is that while they may be able to explain the causes of one long war, individual
cases in isolation can say little about overall trends. Most clearly, a negative finding
in a single case does little to rule out a probabilistic explanation of state behavior.29
Of course, multiple case studies can employ comparative methods and generate
reasons to believe both that the causal arguments are correct and that they operate
widely.30
27. Stanley, Paths to Peace (see note 16 above); Elizabeth A. Stanley and John P. Sawyer,
“The Equifinality of War Termination: Multiple Paths to Ending War,” Journal of Conflict Res-
olution 53 (2009): 651–76.
28. Also, some leadership turnovers may be caused by the decision to seek peace, rather than
being a cause of the decision to end the war. For instance, the decision to appoint Prince Maximil-
ian of Baden as German Chancellor in September 1918 was made after the decision to ask for an
armistice had been made, and it was made in order to shift the responsibility for peace onto the
German liberals; see David Stevenson, “1918 Revisited,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28 (2005):
107–39.
29. Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” American Polit-
ical Science Review 65 (1971): 682–93, at 686.
30. James Rosenau, “Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy or Field?,” International Stud-
ies Quarterly 12 (1968): 296–329.
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However, even fine-grained case studies of long wars can run into difficulties that
go beyond these issues that all case studies face. Specifically, much as with statistical
analyses, individual cases may contain behavior that is consistent with many com-
peting explanations. For example, consider the debate over the causes of continued
fighting in World War I after 1916, when the stalemate on the Western Front was
obvious to all. Well-supported, competing theories have claimed that the war con-
tinued for reasons of domestic politics, honor, commitment problems, or the intro-
duction of new private information.31 Since these theories predict that leaders would
have made very different sorts of arguments in government deliberations, one would
expect case studies to be able to sort out which causes are most important in a given
long war. But the ongoing disagreement over why fighting continued for as long as
it did in World War I suggests that some other difficulty must be at work.
One reason, which is made apparent by domestic politics approaches to war du-
ration, is that decisions to continue fighting aremade by groups of individuals. Since
two or more states need to choose war in order for fighting to continue, multiple
groups of many individuals are involved. There is no reason to expect various lead-
ers to weight reasons of state, personal gain, or intangibles like honor equally. In-
deed, members of a government might not even face the same incentive structures.
Some may benefit more from the direct exploitation of natural resources during
conflicts, while others may be in more danger of being removed from office or oth-
erwise harmed after the war. Also, individuals may advance an argument not be-
cause it is the one they find most compelling, but because they believe that the argu-
ment is the one most likely to persuade others. This means that different arguments
may be raised at different times, and it may not always be clear which ones matter
most. Therefore, while it is possible to observe which factions win debates about
war and peace, it is not always possible to determine which motives are most com-
pelling in leading a particular faction to favor the course that it does or which argu-
ments are most important in persuading skeptics to ultimately back the war.
For example, after the initial U.S. victories in northernMexico during theMexican-
American War (1846–48), members of the Mexican government emphasized very
different reasons for continuing the war. President López de Santa Anna reasonably
believed he could remain in power only if he delivered military victory. He also be-
lieved at first that he could defeat isolated U.S. forces in northern Mexico and later
that the rough terrain between Veracruz and Mexico City would allow for a successful
31. Goemans,War and Punishment, 36–51 (see note 1 above); Lanoszka andHunzeker, “Rage
of Honor” (see note 20 above); Reiter, How Wars End, 21–50 (see note 13 above); Shirkey, “Un-
certainty and War Duration,” 250–52 (see note 14 above).
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Mexican defense. Others argued that the long American supply line from Veracruz
was vulnerable and that attacks on it would force American forces to withdraw. Still
others focused more narrowly on the domestic consequences of continuing the war.
Gomez Farias, the Mexican vice president, favored continued fighting since it would
create an excuse to tax the Catholic Church, while some Liberals hoped that it would
lead to a catastrophic Mexican defeat, enabling them to overthrow the entire Mex-
ican system of government. Meanwhile, the U.S. invasion stimulated feelings of na-
tionalism and honor among much of the Mexican populace, meaning that contin-
ued resistance was popular.32 Thus, Mexican officials favored continued fighting for
a variety reasons, ranging from beliefs that victory was still possible to domestic po-
litical implications.
Thus, it is not enough to find that one or a few important members of a govern-
ment favored continued fighting for a given reason. Rather, given that different in-
dividuals will have favored continued fighting for different reasons, it is necessary to
consider how many members of the government thought in which terms, how in-
fluential they were in the decision to continue fighting, and if their arguments about
why to continue fighting swayed other members of the government.
The other reason that case studies can find significant evidence for competing
theories within the same case is that individual leaders may have multiple motives
for favoring continuing a war. People are rarely driven by single motives when it
comes to their beliefs about political strategies. It is perfectly consistent for an in-
dividual to be concerned simultaneously about any combination of commitment
problems, honor, personal gains, and the ability to hold a domestic coalition to-
gether. It is unlikely that individuals will openly and explicitly rank or weight the
various factors that motivate them to continue the war. Furthermore, individuals
may not be fully aware of how they would weigh the importance of their own mo-
tives. They may engage in rationalizations to avoid acknowledging their real moti-
vations for their actions. They may also half-believe things or make unconscious
tradeoffs between various goods while refusing to acknowledge to themselves that
they are doing so.33 This means that leaders’ own statements of their motives may
not be entirely reliable.
For example, in May 1940, during World War II, British Prime Minister Win-
ston Churchill advanced a variety of reasons for continuing to fight Germany even
32. John S. D. Eisenhower, So Far From God: The US War with Mexico 1846–1848 (New
York: Random House, 1989), 171, 269–74, and 358–68.
33. Jervis, “Understanding Beliefs,” at 644–45 (see note 11 above); Jonathan Mercer, “Emo-
tional Beliefs,” International Organization 64 (2010): 1–31.
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though France was clearly about to be knocked out of the war. First, Churchill ar-
gued that Britain could hold out militarily, provided the United States eventually
entered the war. Second, he believed that any likely German peace conditions would
be intolerable—both in their immediate implications and because they would leave
Britain at Germany’s mercy in coming years. Third, Churchill appealed to national
honor and prestige, arguing that it was better to go down fighting than to surrender,
and that recent defeats in France and Norway had so lowered British prestige that
only further dogged resistance could ever raise it again. Finally, he argued that seek-
ing Italianmediation would be futile and that any diplomatic opening would under-
mine British morale and convince Hitler of Britain’s weakness.34
Churchill never explicitly indicated which of these arguments he thought was
most important, nor is it especially clear which ones were most important in sway-
ing othermembers of the cabinet. Indeed, some of his arguments, such as the notion
that Britain could get better terms from Germany at a later date, may have been de-
ployed purely in the hope of swaying his fellow cabinet members, rather than being
something Churchill actually believed, since he had little or no inclination to ever
ask Germany for terms.
Obviously, this problem of leaders being unclear about their actual motives is
not limited to war duration research.Whatmakes it particularly worrisome in such
research is that, when combined with the challenges discussed above—different in-
dividuals motived by different causes and multiple theories predicting like out-
comes—researchers may be tempted to focus on evidence that confirms their pre-
ferred explanation even though equally compelling evidence for other explanations
may exist.
Taken as a whole, these three difficulties—leaders being unclear about their mo-
tives, different individuals having differentmotives, andmultiple theories of war du-
ration predicting like outcomes—create a considerable challenge for determining
the causes of long wars. Since it is likely that different individuals will have different
motives and that even individuals may have multiple motives, at least some con-
firming evidence for any reasonable explanation probably will exist. Furthermore,
since multiple explanations predict the same behaviors, even if scholars can agree
uponwhich behaviors are important, theymay still be unable to agree onwhichmo-
tive was at work. To be clear, these are serious challenges to research on the duration
of long wars, but they are not insuperable obstacles. Good research, both in the form
34. John Lukacs, Five Days in London, May 1940 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1999), 106–29, 147–49, and 182–83.
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of case studies and statistical analyses, can be and has been done on long wars. Im-
portantly, researchers can adopt several strategies to overcome these challenges.
First, rather than simply suggesting that a cause is possible or that it played some
role in extending a war for many years, researchers need to keep these challenges in
mind and look for evidence that helps to sort out competing explanations. This re-
quires explicitly discussing alternative explanations and how the evidence fits or
does not fit with the various competing explanations. Evidence that rules out po-
tential causes will often be more important than evidence that rules in potential
causes. For example, using large-Nmethods, Weisiger sorts through three compet-
ing explanations about how the revelation of private information relates to war ter-
mination: that new and surprising information should lead to war termination;
that power shifts due to battles should not bring about war termination; and that
all relevant information should be related to termination. 35 The key is that the first
explanation predicts that recent information and battlefield shifts will lead to war
termination,36 the second that only the sum of all relevant information will lead to
war termination,37 and the last that both battlefield shifts and the sum of all infor-
mation will lead to war termination. Thus, by seeing which of these facts are cor-
related with termination andwhich are not correlated with termination,Weisiger is
able to conclude that the combination of recent battlefield shifts and the sum of all
relevant information explanation best fits the available evidence across a wide
range of wars.38 Similar approaches can be adopted for other potential factors using
both case studies and statistical methods.
Second, researchers also need to be open to the likelihood of multicausality and
to think in terms of the relative importance of causes, rather than to look for mono-
causal explanations. While this sounds straightforward enough, it can run against
the grain for those who are used to thinking in terms of big debates or competing
paradigms. Rather than asking, “Which explanation is correct?” it may be better to
ask, “When does each factor apply?” and “How much weight is each factor carry-
ing in explaining a particular outcome?” Both rationalist and domestic politics ap-
proaches have taken an important step in this direction in discussing causes of war
35. Alex Weisiger, “Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and In-
terstate War Duration,” International Organization 70 (2016): 347–75, at 365–71.
36. Shirkey, “Uncertainty and War Termination,” 250–52 (see note 14 above).
37. Donald Wittman, “How War Ends: A Rational Model Approach,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 23 (1979): 743–63.
38. Of course, the other explanations could conceivably work better in a small subset of
wars, even if the overall trend is consistent with the notion that it is the sum of all available
information that best explains war termination.
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termination in terms of “equifinality.”39 Multi-causality also has implications for
statistical analysis, since it can violate the assumption of unit homogeneity. As
Braumoeller puts it, multi-causality “implies a particular form of nonadditivity . . .
the presence or absence of one independent variable mitigates—or in the extreme,
nullifies—the impact of another.”40 This greatly reduces a study’s ability to draw
causal inferences and must be dealt with through interaction terms, case selection,
and model specification.41
Therefore, the key to conducting high-quality research on long wars is to ac-
knowledge the inherent challenges posed by the topic and to design studies accord-
ingly. If this is done, it should be possible to rule out some proposed causes and to
rule others in. It might also allow for determining the relative weights of various
factors in relation to the causes of long wars both overall and for specific wars. With-
out such careful research design, the field likely will continue to generate interest-
ing and plausible explanations, but will fail to make much headway in determining
which explanations are most important in general and for given wars in particular.
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39. Stanley and Sawyer, “The Equifinality of War Termination,” (see note 27 above); Weisiger,
Logics of War, 2–3 (see note 1 above).
40. Bear Braumoeller, “Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics,” Political Analysis 11
(2003): 209–33 at 211.
41. Braumoeller, in “Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics,” 211–15, recommends
the use of Boolean probit and logit models as they can model various combinations of complex-
ity (see previous note).
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